Risk Heterogeneity, Productivity and Social Insurance by Farina, Francesco & Fontini, Fulvio
1Risk Heterogeneity, Productivity and Social 
Insurance
Francesco Farina 
DEPFID, University of Siena
And
Fulvio Fontini
DSE, University of Padua
2N workers partitioned in two categories: H high-skill workers 
and L low-skill workers
two categories of risks: a macroeconomic employment-risk 
exposure (p) and a personal one  (π) (risks can be correlated)
how does the employment probability and the personal risk 
affects preferences on the desired (optimal) level of the tax 
rate (and public services)  when workers have different 
productivities? 
The framework
The research question
3Overtaking the limit of existing models: “what is the impact of 
risk dispersion on the tax rate preferred by the decisive voter?
[…] Say that as a result of globalization, the probability of 
holding the job increases for the skilled workers and declines 
for the unskilled ones. What will be the impact on the tax 
rates that finance unemployment insurance? This is a difficult 
problem and I do not know how to solve it. Moreover, I could 
not find anyone who did. […]” (Przeworski, 2003)
But there is more than just a simple theoretical curiosity…
Motivation:
4An example from the European Union (EU):
From mid 90s, labor supply of low-skill workers has been 
increasing and their wage levels are under pressure, while a 
higher labor demand for the more productive high-skill 
workers is lowering their unemployment risk and rising their 
wage levels.
Because of lowering immigration costs and increasing 
harmonization in labor market legislation a growing number 
of less educated and low-skill immigrants from the Eastern 
countries is expected in the fifteen countries of the Western 
EU member states
(Wildasin 1991 and 2000; Sinn and Ochel, 2003)
5At a first glance…
The diverging probabilities that the high-skills and the low-
skills experience in their respective carrier opportunities 
modify their positions as net contributors and net recipients. 
In probabilistic terms, the high-skills should experience an 
increasing positive difference - and the low-skills an 
increasing negative difference - between their respective 
funding of the public budget and benefiting from public 
transfers due to unemployment 
Is  such an intuition correct?  
6Some Questions:
1) Should we fear a “race to the bottom” due to the fiscal 
competition (and the difference between capital-labor 
mobility)? 
2) (the Robin Hood paradox): It is generally argued that higher 
market inequality should imply a preference for higher 
taxation (the median voter is poorer) but there are relevant 
counterexamples, such as USA vs. Europe. Why?
7The representative high-skill worker is more productive than 
the low-skill one: 
Public finance is balanced:
(strong) assumption:
(perhaps not too strong: sufficient condition is              ) 
Case 1: p and π uncorrelated
Yj  Yk
  
Yj
Yk
 LH
NTr  NV  tp1 − HYj  1 − p1 − LYk 

YTr  tY − V  p1 −   1 − p1 − 
  HHL Yj   LHL Yk
8Expected utility of high and low-skill is: 
Assume U is CRRA:
The desired (optimal) level of t is: 
N.B.: in the literature the expected income is replaced by the 
average one (because of l.l.n): 
Here it is not possible to do so, since variations of p influence 
the relative share of high and low income workers who works
EUj  p1 − U1 − tYj  1 − pUt

Y   − 1 − pUV
EUk  1 − p1 − U1 − tYk  pUtY   − pUV
Ug  g1−
ti∗  1 1−si YiY
1− 1 −1
ij,k sj  p1−p , sk 
1−p
p
t Y  t  iYiN 
9For high-skill workers, the optimal t decreases as their 
macroeconomic risk lowers: ∂tj/∂p < 0 (Proposition 1)
For low-skill workers, the sign of ∂tk/∂(1-p) depends on σ. 
There exists a threshold level σ°. For σ < σ°, the optimal t
rises as their macroeconomic risk increases: ∂tk/∂(1-p) < 0. 
For σ > σ°, the opposite is true (Proposition 2)
Proposition 3: For both high and low-skill workers, the optimal 
t rises as their personal risk increases: ∂ti/∂π > 0
N.B. Prop. 2 shows that the intuitive conjecture of slide 5 is not 
fully confirmed (it applies only to high-skills and low-risk-
averse low-skills) 
Main findings
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Behavior of high-risk-averse low-productivity workers seems 
counterintuitive (the more they are risk-averse the less tax they 
desire?)
But…
Is it really such? Let the ex-post individual welfare function of k be 
the following C.E.S. function 
See that Wk(⋅) assumes the Leontiev form min{Yk,Y,V} as sigma 
tends to infinitive, i.e., she cares about the minimum, not the 
expected value
WkYk ,Y,V  1 − tYk1−  t

Y1−  V1− 11−
11
k does not choose a higher t since this would lower the ex-post
income in case she remained employed, while in case she ended up
under unemployment spell the increase in public budget due to the 
rise in the employment probability of the high-skill workers would 
more than compensate the reduction in transfers due to the 
decrease in the proportional tax rate t, which rises the ex-post 
transfers.  
There exists a publicly-provided / private risk-insurance trade-off: 
labor income = self-protection from risks, t = cost-opportunity of 
relying on a publicly-provided protection. Proposition 2 shows that 
high risk-averse people prefer to self-insure themselves from risks 
12
Assumption: ∂π/∂p < 0 (several studies seem to confirm this, 
e.g. Sen, 1993)
How does this assumption changes the behavior of high and 
low skills?
See that p has now two effects on t: a direct one and an indirect 
one (through π)
For high-skills the effect on π reinforces the impact on t of a 
change in p: same direction (proposition 6)  
Same is true for low-risk-averse low-skills (proposition 7)
For high-risk-averse low skills, the impact of p on t is 
ambiguous: t lowers iff the direct effect ((∂tj/∂p)|π) is greater 
than the indirect one ((∂tj/∂π)((∂π/∂p))
case 2: π and p are correlated (p = p(π))
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Question: should we fear a “race to the bottom” due to the fiscal 
competition (and the difference between capital-labor 
mobility)? 
Answer: It depends on the fraction of very high risk-averse low-
skill workers. Unless it is large enough there will not be any 
"race to the bottom" of tax rate. Moreover, when the 
hypothesis of cross-correlation between the macroeconomic 
and the personal risks is added, it is even less likely that the
median voter will orient the collective decision to cutting 
taxation. 
We can now answer (at least qualitatively…) the 
questions posed before
14
Question (the Robin Hood paradox): It is generally argued that 
higher market inequality should imply a preference for 
higher taxation (the median voter is poorer) but there are 
relevant counterexamples, such as USA vs. Europe. Why?
Answer. There are two typical explanations: 
1) the median voter is influenced in the US by the high-income 
individuals' opinion that less public intervention will boost 
market incentives and growth (Benabou, 2000, Benabou and 
Ok, 2001)
2) lower-than-mean income voter forecasts that a higher share 
of his personal income devoted to higher education will 
allow his son to increase his expected income if taxes (and 
public expenditures) are cut so that private firms will be able 
to raise profits and fund investments in new technologies 
(Hassler et al., 2004).
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Our explanation is different: the preference for a lower t
depends on the median voter being a high-risk-averse low 
skill, or that the fraction of high-risk-averse low skill 
workers is higher that the low-risk averse-ones (as a 
corollary, notice that in our model the “race to the bottom” is 
more likely in the US than in Europe)
But…
does it make sense to suppose that in the US low-skill workers 
are more risk-averse than the European ones? A plausible (?) 
conjectures:  sigma endogenous (depending on the degree of 
inequality)
There is room for further analysis…
